Iran-Saudi Agreement & Geopolitics

Over time, archrivals in the Middle East are experiencing a new wave of rapprochement and reconciliation. After recognising that past geopolitical, diplomatic ad hocism only exposed the region's power limitations, political ineptness, and fragility of state systems, the region, which has been tormented by more than a decade of violence and chaos involving militias, proxies, and both internal and external military assaults, now appears to be looking for a new polity.

The signing of the Iran-Saudi Arabia truce to restore diplomatic ties under the auspices of China on March 10, 2023, came as a startling diplomatic exercise amid the significant geopolitical changes represented by the Abraham Accord, the lifting of Qatar's blockade, Turkey's all-out normalisation process, and the impending reinstatement of Syria in the Arab League.

Both nations would soon open missions and consulates in each other's capitals as part of this agreement, and high-level visits from both sides are likely to follow. Both parties have pledged to renew previous security accords and review trade and technological agreements. The diplomatic impasse, which lasted nearly seven years, was broken after decades of engagement between the two sides through proxies and militias in various regions of the world.

Arab commentators see the "Beijing Agreement," as it is known in the media, as a starting point for new history in the region, and many have drawn comparisons to the Elysee Agreement, which was signed in 1963 between France and West Germany and put an end to the bloodiest period of European war history.

The agreement reached through mediation by China has shown that all disputes, regardless of when they start or end, end in peace. Additionally, it is anticipated that this agreement will mark the beginning of a new phase in relations between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and other GCC members may rush to strengthen their own ties with Iran.

Truce signals a change in global politics

The agreement cannot be viewed solely as a continuation of an ongoing regional strategic readjustment or in isolation, but it does reflect shifting regional and global strategic templates.

The peace agreement brokered by China is not just an explicit sign of the U.S.'s declining interest in the Middle East due to its growing disillusionment with the new polity and perhaps its own deliberate preference for a change in its strategic pivot, but also reflects China's growing desire to diversify its role in the region.

The past attempts by Oman and Iraq in 2021–2022 to get both sides to the negotiating table are no longer a secret, but they may have fallen short of providing anything concrete due to their lack of ability, as a small-size power, to ensure the deal's sustainability or apply pressure in the event that one of the parties drifts or departs from the deal's core principles.

Due to its greater economic and political clout, China is better equipped to triumph over both if such a situation arises. Furthermore, China is no longer just a player in the economy; it has recently expanded its influence and signed large-scale agreements with both Iran and Saudi Arabia.

China's mediation effort is probably going to deepen and broaden its engagement model in the region, and the nation already appears to be working on a new one that, of course, won't have any goals or plans that resemble those of the United States.

While the U.S.'s growing perplexity in the region has long been apparent, it only became more so in recent years when it began to ask Middle Eastern regimes to take responsibility for its own security and showed complete indifference to its closest allies when their oil installations and other strategic sites were allegedly targeted by Iran in 2019. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) being scrapped and American President Joe Biden's aggressive anti-Saudi rhetoric during his election campaign and his early years in the White House enraged Saudi Arabia, which further enraged Iran.

It's possible that the possibility of a new security environment and growing indications of U.S. disengagement prompted Saudi Arabia to review its prior policy.

According to Saudi Arabia, the agreement represents a move away from politics towards an emphasis on economic sectors in line with its Vision 2030, which unquestionably calls for a stable region.

On the other hand, for Iran, this agreement appears to be a step closer to deepening its ties with both Russia and China, which are posing new challenges to its old enemy, the United States, and both are determined to alter the previously U.S.-led global order. Regionally, the agreement might thwart plans for closer ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, whose current prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, views a campaign against Iran as a personal cause.

Israel's desire to forge an anti-Iran alliance in the region may be undermined by increased diplomatic efforts between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Success breeds success, and Saudi Arabia might even act as a middleman in upcoming talks between Iran and the United States.

A bad deal is preferable to no deal

While it's critical to enter negotiations with integrity, it's also crucial to understand that a bad deal is worse than none at all. Therefore, to be upbeat or enthusiastic at this point would be unwise. Since many of the regional problems are directly related to previous animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia, there is still a long way to go before the goal of the deal is even partially achieved.

One must wait to see if the agreement will bring peace to Yemen, which has been torn apart by war, or if the promised peace will ensure the security and safety of oil and other strategic installations throughout the region, stop the rocket attacks across various borders, or bring back a new, stable polity to Iraq and Lebanon.

This deal would be useless for the war-torn region until these problems are resolved. The success of the deal also depends on Israel, so it is important to determine whether a deal and Israel's current hawkish policy could coexist, if so, for how long, and, if not, what would happen to the deal.

The United States has already expressed its pessimism and said that it was unsure whether the Iranians would keep their word. How to protect the deal from the challenges ahead is the biggest challenge.

There is no reason why the United States shouldn't favour a peaceful region, but it has no desire to see China play a larger role there. China is undoubtedly gaining ground in the Middle East quickly, but it would be unrealistic to assume that China would take the place of the United States as a security provider or peacekeeper. A deal brokered by China is also unlikely to jeopardise the century-old alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Washington has witnessed the region's development and played a role in influencing it.Despite all of these ifs and buts, the deal's significance for fostering trust and laying the groundwork for the next step towards regional integration cannot be understated, and soon, there would be a mix of continuity and change in the Saudi-Iran relationship.